SHOWDOWN AT THE HIT FACTORY
New Yorker, November 21, 1994
THE WORLD OF BUSINESS Warner Music’s Mo Ostin had one of the most powerful jobs in the industry. When he left it, the record men went to war.
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BY FREDRIC DANNEN
ON THE MORNING of October 27, 1994, ten senior executives of the Warner Music Group, the largest record company in the world, met secretly in an apartment on Central Park West and, in effect, declared war on the chairman and chief executive officer of the company, a man named Robert J. Morgado. Warner Music, a division of Time Warner, is the only one of the record industry’s six major companies that is American owned, and for decades it had also been the most stable. Now it was on the verge of meltdown.
A mood of rebellion against Morgado had been building for months at all three of the company’s big labels—Atlantic Records and Elektra Records, in New York, and Warner Bros. Records, in Los Angeles, the last of which had been run for twenty-five years by a former protégé of Frank Sinatra named Mo Ostin. In the recorded-music industry, which tenders its greatest respect to “record men” or “music men”—those people with the ability to recognize and develop talent—Ostin was revered. He was a paradigm of the type of freewheeling manager who thrived under the late Steve Ross, the chairman of Time Warner. Ross, whatever his shortcomings, had a gift for handling creative people, and he allowed Ostin to run his division without interference; in return, Ostin had made Warner Bros. the most profitable record label in the United States, with a roster of artists that included Madonna, Prince, Paul Simon, Talking Heads, Eric Clapton, and R.E.M. Though Ross, in 1990, had appointed Robert Morgado to his current position as head of all the American labels—along with Warner’s foreign labels, record club, and music-publishing company—Ostin, whose title was chairman of Warner Bros. Records, had insisted on reporting directly to Ross; after Ross died, in late 1992, Ostin and Morgado had clashed. “Morgado does not have a feel for a creative business,” Ostin explained recently. “He is not from show business.”
Indeed, Morgado had been the chief of staff for Governor Hugh Carey before being hired by Ross, in 1982. A man of unmistakable intelligence—even his detractors will acknowledge that—Morgado is also rather impersonal, and somewhat bland. He tends to show the most emotion when he is describing his strategic plan for the Warner Music Group, using terms like “manifest destiny” and “leverage” and, especially, “vertical integration.” Morgado sees a future in which the labels take full advantage of the group’s size by working together—just the opposite of the Steve Ross philosophy, which had been to let them compete. Unfortunately, not all the veteran record men at the labels, who had risen up under Ross, shared Morgado’s dream—not Bob Krasnow, who ran Elektra Records, and certainly not Mo Ostin.
Morgado therefore needed a strong, credible ally to help him overcome the labels’ resistance, and he believed he had found that ally in Doug Morris, the co-chairman of Atlantic Records, who had begun as a songwriter and record producer. (Morris had co-written “Sweet Talkin’ Guy,” a 1966 hit for the Chiffons, and had produced “Smokin’ in the Boys Room” for Brownsville Station seven years later.) Though Morris was perhaps not held in as high esteem by the industry as Mo Ostin, he was indisputably a record man. Last July, Morgado promoted Morris to a new position, just below him, in which he would oversee with him all the American labels; within a month, Ostin resigned.
Morgado’s victory was short-lived, however, because he soon found himself facing down a new adversary: Doug Morris. After promoting Morris to a position of leadership, Morgado had steadily chipped away at his ability to lead. Finally, Morris felt he had been left without any authority at all; and at that point he marshalled his forces in the record group at the Central Park West apartment, in a dramatic, and fateful, attempt to win his authority back.
ROBERT MORGADO has never claimed to be a record man, or even to know much about music. There is no stereo in his office. He is fifty-one, about five feet nine, and dark complexioned, with a broad face and a grin that reminds one of the Cheshire cat. A native of Honolulu, he is the son of an immigrant Portuguese father and a Polynesian mother. On a recent afternoon, Morgado talked to a reporter about his long-range plans for the Warner Music Group. He was wearing a blue button-down shirt with a monogram, and, as he spoke, he took sips from a pint bottle of Evian and distractedly tore off its label.
Morgado rarely gives interviews, and acknowledges that he suffers from an image problem. It upsets him to read continually that he has a background in politics; as he sees it, his career was in public service. After earning a master’s degree from the graduate school of public affairs at SUNY at Albany, in 1965, he worked as a budget and financial analyst with the New York State Legislature; in 1975, he became an aide to Governor Carey, and two years later he was appointed the Governor’s chief of staff. Steve Ross, the head of what was then called Warner Communications, which had its headquarters in New York, had been a fund-raiser for the Governor, and just before Carey left office, in 1982, Ross made Morgado his special assistant.
Four months later, Warner Communications experienced the biggest crisis in its history: the bottom fell out of its Atari unit, which made video games, and Warner’s stock price dropped nearly seventeen points in one day. Desperate to reduce corporate overhead, Ross selected Morgado to eliminate as many jobs as possible, thereby earning Morgado the epithet of “hatchet man.” “Steve knew that we had to downsize, and he was looking for someone to make it happen,” Morgado says. “He asked me.”
In 1985, Ross appointed Morgado a senior executive, with responsibility for Warner’s recorded music and music publishing. The appointment came as no great shock to the labels. Ross had given similar responsibilities to David Horowitz, one of four members of his Office of the President (since disbanded), and Horowitz had not tried to meddle in the day-to-day affairs of the labels. Morgado, like Horowitz, was viewed mainly as a liaison between the labels and the corporation. But in 1990, shortly after Warner Communications merged with Time, Inc., to create Time Warner, all the domestic and foreign labels were assembled under a new corporate shell, the Warner Music Group, to be headed by Morgado; two years later, Ross died of cancer. Ross’s successor, Gerald M. Levin, appeared to have taken a liking to Morgado, and gave him his full backing.
It was not hard to see why: under Morgado, the labels’ results had been excellent. Since 1985, the combined revenues of the labels had risen from around nine hundred million dollars to $3.3 billion last year. The group’s 1993 earnings, of $296 million, surpassed those of every other Time Warner division except cable television. The Warner labels have consistently led the industry in United States market share; for the first ten months of this year, Warner had 22.2 per cent of the market, compared with 15.3 per cent for Sony Music, its nearest competitor.
Ostin and other veteran record men within Warner were fiercely proud of these results but were annoyed that Morgado should take any credit for them. After all, Morgado had entered the record business the same year that the compact disk began to take off, and it was that change which had given the industry its first significant price increases in years; worldwide industry revenues had climbed in less than a decade from about twelve billion dollars to about thirty billion. Without a doubt, though, Morgado deserved credit for building the record company’s presence in Europe and Latin America, partly through acquisition. More than half of Warner Music’s revenues now come from overseas, and Morgado believes that the ratio can go even higher; he sees Asia as the next frontier. “I sit here and see a market of two hundred million Indonesians, and somehow I know that’s gonna be an important business for us,” he says.
Morgado’s strategy is to strengthen the company through vertical integration—the concept of reducing one’s dependence on others and increasing one’s control, as happens when, say, a paper manufacturer buys forest land. Last spring, Morgado invited four of the five other major record companies and Ticketmaster to join him in creating an alternative music-video channel to MTV; to his dismay, the Justice Department is investigating whether the plan violates antitrust laws.
THE MAN Morgado saw as the biggest obstacle to his plan to unify the labels is short and slight, bald, and given to wearing a sports jacket with an open shirt collar. Mo Ostin was born in New York in 1927 but grew up in Los Angeles. In 1954, four years after graduating from U.C.L.A. with an honors degree in economics, Ostin joined Verve, a jazz label, as controller, but, he says, did a little of everything—sales, marketing, finance, and A. & R., or artists and repertoire. In 1960, Frank Sinatra, having grown disgruntled with Capitol Records, where he’d made records for eight years, created his own label, Reprise, to put out his recordings and, subsequently, those of Sammy Davis, Jr., Dean Martin, and other mainstream pop singers. “Frank hired me the first time I met him, and made me the head of his company,” Ostin says. Three years later, Reprise merged with Warner Bros. Records, an adjunct to the Burbank movie studio. Though Sinatra had little use for rock music, Ostin took an early interest in it, and following the merger he signed the Kinks and Jimi Hendrix. After more than two decades, he was still signing rock acts: in 1990, he pursued and got the Red Hot Chili Peppers.
Morgado faults Ostin for the bad blood between them. He recalls, “Mo would say to me, ‘This is not personal—but you shouldn’t really exist. We don’t need you.’ “
“I’ve never said anything like that,” Ostin says. “But I did have a problem with Morgado with respect to reportage. My contract clearly defined that I reported either to Steve Ross or to his successor. I negotiated very, very hard for that point.… I had been dealt with by Steve Ross as an executive who had a lot of autonomy, who ran this company as if it were my own business. And the results were just fantastic. Bob Morgado came from a totally different management place. He was a guy who came out of politics—power, control, and things of that sort were very important to him. And he attempted to control me, and I felt that that was not the proper way in which we could relate to one another.”
Morgado acknowledged that under Ostin’s contract Ostin “technically” reported to the head of Time Warner. “But what does that mean?” he said. “It had no concrete manifestation in a day-to-day sense, because his business reported to me. People like to hang on to words.”
Clearly, though, Ostin was a threat to Morgado’s authority. “I was perfectly happy to deal with him in his coordinative and liaison capacity in the record group,” Ostin says. “I just didn’t want him to interfere in my business.”
THE TIME WARNER BUILDING, at 75 Rockefeller Plaza, where Morgado has his office, is also home to Warner’s two large East Coast labels, Atlantic and Elektra, and Morgado had plenty of opportunity to observe the managers of those labels at work. One person who stood out was Atlantic’s president, Doug Morris—the man who had written “Sweet Talkin’ Guy.” Morris, who still keeps a piano in his office, is fifty-four, compactly built, with a trim beard and a pronounced New York accent. (He grew up in Woodmere, Long Island.) He is gregarious and nurturing; his personality is altogether different from Bob Morgado’s. “Doug is the kind of guy who calls all his top executives every Friday, wishes them a good weekend, and tells them what geniuses they are,” Danny Goldberg, one of those executives, says.
Within Atlantic, Morris had his own nurturing boss in Ahmet Ertegun, the label’s co-founder and chairman, who was as much an industry legend as Mo Ostin. The son of a Turkish ambassador, Ertegun had helped launch Atlantic in 1947 to record rhythm-and-blues artists like Ray Charles and, later on, Aretha Franklin; by the seventies, he had turned Atlantic into a rock label, with the Rolling Stones and Led Zeppelin. He had got to know Doug Morris in 1974, when Atlantic made a distribution deal for Big Tree, a small label that Morris had founded; Atlantic bought Big Tree four years later, and in 1980 Ertegun named Morris the president of Atlantic. Ertegun has nothing but praise for Morris. “Of all the people I’ve worked with, he’s the straightest person I’ve ever known,” he says. “He does not have what the French call arrière-pensées—hidden thoughts. It’s incredible, but in all the years I’ve been with Doug we have never had an argument and we have never left the office without hugging one another.”
By 1990, the year Morgado was promoted to his current post, Atlantic had been in decline for some time. Ertegun was now approaching seventy; the days when he courted the Rolling Stones aboard the Warner corporate jet were behind him. Atlantic’s annual revenues had flattened to about three hundred and fifty million dollars, and most of that amount came from “catalogue”—the sale of old recordings by bands like Genesis and Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young. Ertegun acknowledged the need for a succession plan, and, unlike other veteran record men in the Warner Music Group, he put up little resistance to Morgado; in fact, he agreed with Morgado that there were competitive advantages to be gained from unifying the labels. In November of 1990, with Ertegun’s blessing, Bob Morgado elevated Doug Morris to co-chairman of Atlantic.
Morris and Morgado seemed to like each other well enough, but the bond really linking them was one of mutual usefulness. Morris’s promotion reflected well on Morgado. This year, the rechristened Atlantic Group is expected to report sales of a billion dollars. Though some of the growth has come from non-musical businesses—notably exercise videos—most of it has come from new hit records. In 1990, Morris gambled millions of dollars of Atlantic’s money as a twenty-five-per-cent investor in Interscope Records, a new label created by the record producer Jimmy Iovine and the retail heir Ted Field. Though Iovine had produced and engineered albums by John Lennon, Bruce Springsteen, and U2, he had no track record as a businessman, and until Morris came along he could not find a backer. “No one would give me a deal,” Iovine says. “But Doug did.” Interscope has since become the hottest independent label in the United States, with multiplatinum albums by the rappers Snoop Doggy Dogg and Dr. Dre and the alternative-rock band Nine Inch Nails. Interscope is expected to gross over a hundred million dollars domestically this year.
Morris also recruited new executive talent to Atlantic. In 1992, he persuaded Danny Goldberg, an artist’s manager whose clients included Bonnie Raitt and Nirvana, to run Atlantic’s West Coast office; this past January, Goldberg was promoted to president of the label and subsequently moved to New York. Goldberg, who is forty-four, is nasal-voiced, slightly nerdy, and well known for involvement in liberal causes: he has been active in the A.C.L.U., and he co-produced and co-directed the “No Nukes” concert film. Kurt Cobain, the lead singer of Nirvana, who committed suicide earlier this year, had referred to Goldberg as his “spiritual father.” Goldberg, in his two years at Atlantic, has brought in at least three hot new acts: the singer-songwriters Juliana Hatfield and Liz Phair, and the hugely successful alternative-rock band Stone Temple Pilots. For the first six months of 1994, Atlantic outperformed Warner Bros.—an achievement that just a few years ago would have been considered impossible.
Then, on July 11, 1994, Morgado promoted Doug Morris again, to president and chief operating officer of Warner Music‑U.S., a newly created holding company for all the American labels. Ertegun gave the move his benediction, but over at Elektra its chairman, Bob Krasnow—another veteran who had clashed with Morgado—appeared to take the appointment as an affront. He resigned the next day.
Morgado and Morris immediately had a problem on their hands with Metallica, a speed-metal band on Elektra that was one of the most successful acts within the Warner Music Group. Since 1984, when Krasnow signed Metallica to its original contract with Elektra, the band had produced four studio albums that had together sold about eighteen million copies in the United States. The band members and their managers, Cliff Burnstein and Peter Mensch, had had an excellent relationship with Krasnow and were upset over his leaving. They were even more upset because a deal that they claimed had been negotiated with Krasnow in May—a joint venture that would give the band fifty-per-cent ownership of its master recordings—had not gone to contract.
About a week after Morris’s promotion, a meeting was held in a conference room of the Time Warner Building to discuss a new deal for Metallica. Burnstein and Mensch came dressed in their usual jeans and sneakers, and were met by Morgado, Morris, and two lawyers. The managers had an uneasy history with Doug Morris: they had previously managed the band AC/DC on Atlantic, and Morris had barred them from the building for a time for badmouthing the label. But at the meeting, which lasted about half an hour, Morgado did all the talking. He explained that a joint venture was out of the question, and that Warner Music preferred to assume the risk, implying that the company would offer a large advance. An offer was made a few days later: about twenty million dollars for four new albums and a box set of the band’s greatest hits. “We almost had to laugh,” Burnstein says. “After all that pontification about ‘We want to take the risk’! The way we calculate it, if we never made a new record, they’d recoup that money just on catalogue sales.”
Before long, Metallica filed suit in California, where the band is based, to be released from its existing contract. Warner in turn filed suit in New York against the band for a hundred million dollars in damages for anticipated breach of contract—an unusual hardball tactic for a record company to take against its musicians. Lars Ulrich, the band’s drummer, publicly vilified Morgado, calling him “greedy and arrogant.” The litigation is still pending.
THE APPOINTMENT of Doug Morris did not sit well at Warner Bros. Records, in Burbank. Though Mo Ostin says he likes Morris, the notion of having to answer to an industry figure lesser than himself must have galled him, and Ostin acknowledges that he has “confronted” Morris for being unduly boastful about the turnaround at Atlantic. “Except for the first six months of this year, Warner has consistently outperformed Atlantic in market share and profit contribution,” Ostin says. “And, since we’re in a business of the arts, one also has to look at the quality of the music you put out. If you look at the Grammy Awards as one example and compare Warner and Atlantic, that will tell you a lot. Just no contest.”
Warner Bros. Records endured a long cold spell until recently, when big hits by two new groups, Green Day and Candlebox, and new releases by Madonna, Eric Clapton, and R.E.M. put the label back at the top of the charts. Ostin deeply resents the suggestion that Warner Bros. Records has become too reliant on its old acts, and is happy to recite a long list of emerging talent, in addition to Green Day and Candlebox, on the active roster.
Morgado says that he became concerned about the cold spell at Warner around the time he promoted Morris to head Warner Music‑U.S. “I wanted Doug to work with them,” he said. “I didn’t know what the problem was. Did they have the wrong A. & R. people? I thought Doug would have a better spin.”
The final blowup between Ostin and Morgado came over the issue of succession. Ostin turned sixty-seven this year, but he is in excellent health and is in no mood to retire from the business. “Mo was there from the beginning, and he wasn’t quite prepared to accept that there does come a time when you’ve got to build the next generation,” Morgado said. “He was quite happy to go on another three years, and then worry about the transition after that. I didn’t think that was right.”
Ostin calls that statement absurd. Within Warner Bros., he says, everyone had known for years that he was grooming an eventual successor in Lenny Waronker. Waronker, who is fifty-two, is a shy, soft-spoken Los Angeles native who began producing records for Warner Bros. in 1966; among his credits are albums by Randy Newman and Ry Cooder. He advanced into A. & R., and in 1982 Ostin made him the president of Warner Bros. Records. Morgado said he had doubts, however, that Waronker possessed the management skills to run a record label. “That’s because Morgado is hung up on form and structure instead of substance,” Ostin says. “The most important thing any record executive can do is sign and develop artists. And in that department Lenny is as good as they come.”
Last spring, Ostin was offered a new three-year contract, which would have kept him on as chairman of Warner Bros. through the end of 1998. The contract specified that he would have to report to Morgado. “I stuck it in a drawer,” Ostin says. “There were pressures put on me, and I just could not get myself to sign that document. I did not feel I could be happy if I continued under the new set of circumstances. In fact, I felt I would be miserable. And when I came to the realization that I could let go—which was very, very painful for me, after all the years I had put in—and I addressed the idea of leaving, I almost felt a sense of relief.”
On August 15th, in a letter to the staff of Warner Bros., Ostin wrote, “I am neither resigning nor retiring. I am, however, moving on.” As of January 1, 1995, he would become a consultant to Time Warner’s chairman, Gerald Levin, for an unspecified period. The news that Mo Ostin, the Great Record Man, had been forced to leave Warner Bros. before his time—that was how the industry took it—was greeted with a degree of outrage that must have come as a surprise to Morgado. For all Morgado’s doubts about Lenny Waronker, it was Waronker who saved him from even greater opprobrium, by agreeing to take over as chairman when Ostin left the label.
Around this time, Morris began to encounter serious difficulties with Morgado. The two men were deadlocked over Interscope, the hot independent label created by Jimmy Iovine and Ted Field which Morris had gambled on. Atlantic was still a minority shareholder in Interscope, and Morris was anxious to exercise a buyout option to acquire the label from Iovine and Field. Under the terms of the agreement, after a certain date Interscope could solicit outside bids, and unless Atlantic was willing to match the highest bid it would be forced to sell its shares. Morris was fearful that Sony or PolyGram would snatch the label away, but Morgado was hesitant about approving the asking price for the outstanding shares; according to industry rumor, Iovine and Field valued their company at three hundred million dollars. (Iovine will not confirm the figure, but says, “I’m not gonna sit here and be coy and say I don’t want to make a fortune.”) Morgado did agree to let Interscope solicit bids early, as a way to establish a market price, but then, inexplicably—and without consulting Morris—he threatened to litigate if any other company actually tried to purchase Interscope. Morris was horrified; Morgado’s heavy-handedness was sure to antagonize Iovine and Field, and might even destroy Atlantic’s chances of acquiring the label. (By last week, no deal with Interscope had been struck.)
Soon Morris was in for another shock. For four years, Entertainment Weekly, a magazine published by Time Warner, had compiled an annual list of what it calls the “Power 101”—the most influential people in movies, television, music, books, and video. Each person on the list merits a photograph or an illustration and a resume. As the fifth annual survey was going to press, in mid-October, a fact-checker for the magazine called Morgado’s office. Mary Kaye Schilling, the senior editor in charge of the Power 101 issue, says that the staff was particularly concerned about Morgado, because the previous year the magazine had made an error in his entry. But the checker inadvertently revealed that Morgado was to share his spot on the list with Doug Morris; Schilling says that Morgado’s press representative told her that Morgado would find it “insulting” to be ranked equally with Morris. She adds, “It was eleven at night, and Jim Seymore”—the managing editor—”just said ‘Fuck it’ and took Morris out. It was a mistake to give in to the publicist.” Morris was badly shaken by this latest humiliation.
The last thing that Warner Music needed now was more trouble, but on Monday, October 24th, Lenny Waronker suddenly reversed his earlier decision to succeed Mo Ostin as chairman of Warner Bros. Records. In his own letter to the staff, Waronker said that he would continue to serve as president under his current contract, which expires at the end of next year, and that he would “help in the transition.” The meaning was clear: Waronker was going to quit the company.
Immediately, a number of top Warner acts that had been signed by Ostin and Waronker, among them Tom Petty, Neil Young, R.E.M., and Eric Clapton, publicly protested the imminent departure of Waronker, and blamed corporate management in New York. The members of R.E.M., whose new album, “Monster,” had had its debut at No. 1, and who had only one album left on their contract, hinted that they were shopping for a new label. An air of panic set in. “Everyone was saying that the company was spinning out of control,” Morgado recalled.
ON WEDNESDAY, October 26th, Morris had the first of several tense conversations with Morgado. A new successor to Ostin would have to be brought in rapidly to restore order, but there was no clear candidate. A week earlier, Morris had summoned from London the chairman of Warner Music U.K., a man named Rob Dickins. Dickins has a reputation for being one of the most arrogant and imperious people in the music business. Though he is now only forty-four years old, he had been in charge of operations in the United Kingdom for eleven years, and he made no secret of his ambition to run Warner Bros. Records. After interviewing Dickins, however, Morris had some serious doubts about whether he was the right man for the job. Now Morgado was pressuring Morris to change his mind.
The principal topic of the two men’s ongoing disagreement, however, was whether Doug Morris had any real authority—in the light of the incidents involving Interscope and Entertainment Weekly, it appeared that his job was meaningless. As the day wore on, the last traces of civility between Morgado and Morris began to break down. Around midday, Time Warner’s chairman, Gerald Levin, dropped by Morgado’s office for a few minutes. Levin had had his own problems recently: Time Warner stock was trading near its one-year low, in part because of regulatory issues that might adversely affect the company’s cable-television unit, but also because of continuing concerns about the quality of management at the company following the death of Steve Ross. Levin brusquely told Morgado and Morris that they must settle their differences, or he would have to step in and settle them himself. Hours later, however, Morgado and Morris were still at an impasse.
Even though Morris had officially been promoted to president and chief operating officer of Warner Music‑U.S. in July, he had yet to sign his employment contract. In utter frustration, Morris had been offering to return the contract unsigned and go back to Atlantic Records. By ten that evening, Morris had left the Time Warner Building and returned home; Morgado called him to say that the offer to go back to Atlantic was accepted. Around midnight, Morgado phoned Morris again, to tell him that he had called Rob Dickins in London and given him the chairmanship of Warner Bros. Records.
Shortly after the first call from Morgado, Morris began to phone people he considered to be his loyalists, to tell them he had just been demoted. He called Ahmet Ertegun, Danny Goldberg, and Mel Lewinter, the executive vice-president of Warner Music‑U.S. Before the night was over, the news had been broken to six other loyalists: Sylvia Rhone, formerly of Atlantic, whom Morris had appointed chairman of Elektra to replace Bob Krasnow; Val Azzoli, the general manager of Atlantic Records; Stuart Hersch, the chief executive of A*Vision, the home-video and television unit of the Atlantic Group; Jason Flom, the senior vice-president of A. & R. at Atlantic; Tony O’Brien, the Atlantic Group’s chief financial officer; and Ina Meibach, the executive vice-president of the Atlantic Group. All nine loyalists agreed to meet with Morris the next morning at Hersch’s apartment.
At about 1 a.m. London time on Thursday, October 27th, Rob Dickins got a call from Morgado’s office instructing him to take the next Concorde to New York. Dickins caught the 10:30 a.m. flight out of Heathrow, which arrives in New York at ten-twenty the same morning. By a remarkable coincidence, Dickins found himself seated next to Steve Stewart, who is the manager of the Stone Temple Pilots, an Atlantic group. “He was in good spirits and very excited,” Stewart says of Dickins. “We talked about real estate in Burbank.” On arriving in New York, Dickins checked into a room at the Carlyle. He sat and waited for the phone call from Morgado’s office that would summon him to Rockefeller Plaza for his anointment and the press conference that was sure to follow.
Dickins did not know it, but Morris was then back in Morgado’s office, still arguing. Meanwhile, Morris’s loyalists had gathered at the Hersch apartment, and their emotions ran high. Was Morgado really demoting Doug or just calling his bluff? Finally, the group discussed consulting lawyers to explore all possible options, including early release from their employment contracts. Morris arrived at the apartment as the meeting was about to break up; according to one of the attendees, he said, “Let’s have some salmon and get back to work.”
Morris returned to his office, and a short time later he got a message from Morgado: the appointment of Dickins was on hold, and Morgado was prepared to try to resolve the problem of his own and Morris’s overlapping responsibilities. Morgado had caved in, and Morris and his loyalists are not sure to this day exactly why, but some of them suspect that Gerald Levin had made good on his threat to intervene; he had spoken on the phone to several of the loyalists and was aware of their discontent. (Levin declined several interview requests for this account. Morgado will not discuss any details of his dispute with Morris, maintaining that it has been “blown way out of proportion.”) By afternoon, Morgado had issued a statement of four brief paragraphs, to reassure the company and the news media that rumors of disharmony between him and Morris were “merely speculation” and “without merit.” In the fourth paragraph, he made a passing reference to “Warner Music‑U.S. chairman and CEO Doug Morris, who is responsible for Warner Music Group’s U.S. recorded-music operations.” Morris’s title had been president; without actually announcing it, Morgado had just given him a promotion.
Rob Dickins was still sitting by the phone in his room at the Carlyle; he did not learn until around nine that evening that Morris had conclusively vetoed his appointment. One of the people who spoke to Dickins that day says, “He ran the gamut of emotions—from fear to disappointment to fury to revenge.” Dickins flew back to London the next morning. Morgado said, “I’m extremely sympathetic, and I feel very bad about Rob. But Doug, if he is to do the job, has to have somebody he feels comfortable about working with.”
By Tuesday, November 1st, it was official: the new chairman and C.E.O. of Warner Bros. Records was Kurt Cobain’s “spiritual father” and Doug Morris’s disciple—Danny Goldberg. After uprooting his wife, Rosemary Carroll, who is a top entertainment lawyer, and their young daughter earlier this year to move from Los Angeles to New York and become president of Atlantic, Goldberg was going to have to uproot them again and move them back to L.A. Meanwhile, Val Azzoli, the general manager of Atlantic, who is a Morris favorite, was promoted to Atlantic president; Ahmet Ertegun stayed on, as solo chairman.
Though Morgado still has authority over Warner Music’s international division, publishing company, and record club, it is Morris, his nominal subordinate, who has the upper hand with the American labels. Now Warner Bros., Elektra, and Atlantic will be run by people who owe their allegiance to Morris. And because of his public schism with Morgado he does not even have to share in the blame for forcing out Ostin and Waronker and Krasnow. Instead, he gets to play the hero—the record man who defeated the ultimate corporate suit.
A FOOTNOTE: The dramatic events at the Warner Music Group did not go unremarked by a group of record-industry people who communicate hourly in a “dirt file” on America Online, the computer service. Most of the correspondents are anonymous—they use handles like Moosebrain and BondGirl and Knowbiz—but not all. Danny Goldberg is among the chatters who signs his name; recently he logged on to try to quell an improbable story that had been making the rounds. (“The rumor of Morgado and Morris coming to blows is totally untrue.”) Mostly, though, the correspondents analyzed the events and debated the fate of the participants. “Morgado down, but not out,” wrote Knowbiz. “Sky, however, is still very gray.” A chatter known as Meannlean offered this observation: “It’s no secret that Mo’s status was a threat to Morgado’s authority within the ‘Time Warner’ Music Group.… Isn’t it ironic that through Morgado’s efforts to gain control from Mo, he lost it to Doug?” ♦