SINS OF THE CITY
Vanity Fair, September, 1990
Alexander DiLorenzo III, the reclusive ex-hippie who owns forty-two acres of Manhattan, is the unlikely slumlord of the Happy Land death trap.
_______________________
BY FREDRIC DANNEN
ON THE NIGHT of March 25, 1990, Lydia Feliciano, a woman who checked coats and occasionally bartended at the Happy Land social club in the Bronx, got into a violent argument with her boyfriend, a Cuban immigrant named Julio Gonzalez. According to testimony before the grand jury that later indicted Gonzalez for the largest mass murder in U.S. history, he left in a drunken, jealous rage and returned a short time later with a dollar’s worth of gasoline and a match. The club, which catered to the local community of Honduran immigrants, had no fire exit and only one door, leading down a steep flight of stairs to the ground level. At about 2:30 A.M., as couples danced to “Young Lover,” a reggae tune, flames roared up from the vacant first floor. In the pandemonium, only five people got out alive, one of them Lydia Feliciano. Eighty-seven people died, many of them almost instantly from smoke inhalation, their drinks still in their hands.
The media played up the tragedy as if it were The Bonfire of the Vanities—disenfranchised victims, rich culprits. Better yet, rich landlords, a most unloved species. The fire brought instant notoriety to Alexander DiLorenzo III, the multimillionaire property owner, and to Jay Weiss, the millionaire leaseholder, who might have been spared some of the attention had his wife not been the actress Kathleen Turner.
It was soon revealed that a full year and a half earlier, the Fire Department had branded Happy Land hazardous and issued a vacate order, which had been ignored. In the wake of the inferno, civil suits in the hundreds of millions of dollars were served on DiLorenzo, Weiss, and Weiss’s partner, Morris Jaffe. There was talk that the Bronx D.A.’s office was considering filing criminal charges against the three men.
What didn’t make it into the news was DiLorenzo’s visit the day after the tragedy to Weiss’s office, which happened to be around the comer from his own. In a recent interview, he recalled finding Weiss “in shock,” talking dejectedly about packing it in and moving to California. “He said, ‘I’m finished! I’m broke! I’m bankrupt! I’m ruined!’ Jay kinda goes on, he gets crazy. I don’t think he ever dreamt something like this would happen. He had violations, he sent them to the tenant. The city issued these things as a regular routine, and then people would go down and get them lifted. Jay is not a stupid guy, O.K.? He didn’t see it. He didn’t put it all together. I’m telling you. I know the guy. I know him since he’s a twenty-year-old kid, you follow? He wasn’t playing with me. He didn’t really understand it. He thought it was a card game, you hear me?”
DiLorenzo laughed softly, nervously. “A card game.”
It had seemed unlikely that DiLorenzo would agree to talk about Happy Land. Apart from his legal problems, he has a reputation for secrecy, even reclusiveness. His former lawyer, John Burns, confirms that “when Alex isn’t sure what he wants to do next, he’ll hide behind unavailability.” But above all else, DiLorenzo is unpredictable. And so, after some cajoling, he entered into his only conversation with a reporter since the fire.
Of the three landlords, DiLorenzo stands the best chance of going to jail. As the building’s owner, he was named on the Fire Department’s 1988 vacate order, and when it went unheeded, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. It was never served, which is not unusual—by one estimate, the city has more than 100,000 unserved warrants against New York landlords, dating back to the 1970s. But after the fire, DiLorenzo’s lawyers told him it would be prudent to turn himself in. On April 3, he surrendered in Manhattan Criminal Court.
At the time, there were forty-three other unserved warrants for his arrest, some dating back to 1978. Indeed, DiLorenzo is infamous as a landlord: this year the New York Daily News conducted a review of eighty-nine buildings owned by DiLorenzo and turned up 5,642 code violations, ranging from water shortages to structural flaws.
If convicted of willfully neglecting the vacate order, DiLorenzo could face ninety days in the slammer. On July 26, he appeared in Bronx Criminal Court and entered a plea of not guilty. It was the second time he had been arraigned on the misdemeanor charge; the first indictment was withdrawn after DiLorenzo’s lawyers objected on technical grounds.
DiLorenzo turns out to he a man of surprising candor. His assessment of the cacophony of legal advice he has received since the fire is typically blunt: “What I feel in my gut, after talking to all these geniuses, is that this is a political nightmare. Eighty-seven people are dead, there are Hondurans screaming, and ‘Who is this rich prick?’—you follow?”
Jay Weiss and Morris Jaffe, meanwhile, have refused to discuss the Happy Land disaster, or anything else. Their attorney, Shep Goldfein, a fire specialist at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, initially agreed to respond to written questions, then backed off on orders from Weiss. Goldfein says Weiss feels embattled. Shortly after the fire, someone left a threatening note on his black Jeep. Weiss and Turner have put their $885,000 Greenwich Village townhouse up for sale and moved elsewhere in the city. Weiss has also relocated his office from East Fifty-second Street to a downtown address. (He and his rock band, Blue Suits, recently put in unpublicized appearances at Manhattan’s Cat Club and China Club, however.) Though Weiss has kept his silence, his wife elected to defend his actions on the evening news. “I’m very sorry that my husband has any link with this,” Kathleen Turner said, “but I can’t conceive of any responsibility for him or for me.” Sydney Schanberg, editorializing in Newsday, was roused to rage. “It’s a pity,” he wrote, “Jay Weiss is so frightened that he lets his wife do the alibiing for him.” He summed up Weiss’s occupation in one curt phrase: “the guy who does all those deals with that master-shark, Alexander DiLorenzo III.”
Actually, “master flake” seems more appropriate: at forty, DiLorenzo may be one of the few Forbes Four Hundred members who prefer to travel by subway. He lives in a rather lugubrious three-bedroom apartment on Manhattan’s East Side, full of packing boxes and mismatched, hand-me-down furniture. Short, stocky, and bearded, often dressed in jeans and a checked lumberjack shirt, he ventures inconspicuously into neighborhoods such as West Harlem, where he owns forty-odd brownstones with more than two hundred apartments deliberately kept vacant—for which angry tenants have repeatedly hanged him in effigy. He carries a Japanese gravity knife he bought at a trade show a few years ago after being mugged.
Alex III, as colleagues call him, is the eldest child of the late Alex DiLorenzo Jr., one of New York’s top real-estate moguls, who, in partnership with Sol Goldman, once held the lease on the Chrysler Building. A bachelor with four children—twice divorced from the same woman—DiLorenzo has a net worth exceeding $500 million and controls almost four hundred properties, forty-two acres’ worth in Manhattan alone, ranging from slum tenements to gems like the Washington Square Mews and the land under the St. Regis hotel. He is, in fact, the city’s largest private landlord (unless you count the estate of Sol Goldman, who died in 1987).
Jay Weiss is a self-made man, worth, DiLorenzo estimates, $10 to $15 million, not counting Turner’s income. The two men met in 1975, when Weiss, twenty years old and broke, asked DiLorenzo for a job. Weiss went on to make his fortune by leasing small commercial buildings, including about thirty owned by DiLorenzo, and then subletting them. One of these is at 1959 Southern Boulevard, the site of Happy Land, part of a row of storefronts that DiLorenzo bought in May 1985, putting $120,000 down on an $885,000 mortgage. Three months after the purchase, DiLorenzo “net-leased” the building to Little Peach Realty, one of several corporations owned by Weiss and Morris Jaffe, a former ladies’-hat merchant. Net-leasing, which typically involves passing responsibility for upkeep to the net-lessee, is a favorite device for DiLorenzo, who has more holdings than his own employees can sensibly manage. Little Peach became the building’s sole tenant for thirty years.
Of course. for Little Peach to profit on the deal, it needed to find a subtenant willing to pay a higher rent. In late 1987, Weiss and Jaffe believed they had found such a man in Elias Colon, who would soon convert the second floor of the building into Happy Land. By early 1990, Little Peach was charging Colon about two grand a month, plus insurance premiums and real-estate tax. Colon was able to draw on the neighborhood’s large Honduran population and fill the club to capacity, which was not difficult—the room’s dimensions were a tiny twenty-two feet by fifty-eight feet, and the ceiling was so low that a person could touch the mirrored ball that spun above the dance floor. Unfortunately, though the club appeared to be thriving, Weiss and Jaffe considered Colon a deadbeat. In February, one month before the fire, Little Peach alleged that Colon owed almost $15,000 in back rent and insurance, and filed papers to evict him.
The city of New York also wanted Colon out, but for different reasons. Happy Land had a single, unmarked exit door, leading to a narrow staircase. There was no fire alarm and no sprinkler system. In November 1988, soon after police had arrested three people at the premises for the illegal sale of liquor, the Fire Department issued a vacate order on safety grounds. It was sent to DiLorenzo, who says his office passed it on to Little Peach. The order was ignored. The following July 24, the police made another arrest at the unlicensed bar, and, on the same day, the Fire Department—now apparently aware that Little Peach was in charge of the building—phoned Morris Jaffe to tell him that the vacate order was still outstanding. Jaffe reportedly said it would be taken care of. At this point, the story of Happy Land was no more than standard fare in the Jay Weiss repertoire: the Daily News investigation later found that eighteen buildings leased by Weiss (and owned by DiLorenzo) had a combined total of 1,241 violations. In Manhattan, one of Weiss’s buildings was cited for 119 violations, including lack of smoke detectors and blocked fire escapes.
A month later, in August 1989, Weiss stopped by Happy Land to harangue Colon about the rent. A Police Department spokesman later explained that Happy Land was by then “in the padlock mode,” meaning the club had broken nearly—but not quite—enough laws for Colon to be forced to vacate. He died in the fire instead.
DiLORENZO has spurned the idea of meeting at a four-star Italian restaurant, saying he would not feel comfortable in so “fancy” a place. Instead, he opts for a small health-food joint on Second Avenue in midtown. He wears a gray suit and striped tie, a Casio sports watch, and a beeper on his belt. He is not carrying his gravity knife, because, he says, it is too bulky with a suit. DiLorenzo looks a bit porcine in photographs, less so in person. His beard, which has flecks of gray, is neatly trimmed, and his black hair hangs straight down in a mop, rather like that of the Three Stooges’ Moe Howard, nearly touching his glasses. DiLorenzo is about five feet six; his weight is said to go up and down by forty pounds. He speaks so softly at times that you must strain to hear him. He has a nervous laugh that sounds like “heh-heh-heh.”
Perhaps the “shark” description fit his father, about whom there were always dark rumors (he attended the funeral of slain mobster Albert Anastasia). Certainly it applied to his father’s partner, Sol Goldman. But Alex III claims he never had the temperament or even the inclination for his current vocation. A former “hippie with hair down to my ankles,” DiLorenzo was twenty-seven and fresh from running a progressive school-without-walls in Brooklyn Heights when his father died suddenly of a massive heart attack. The empire was handed down to him at the worst possible time—it was 1975, the city was in the depths of a fiscal crisis, and the real estate market had crashed. His father and Sol Goldman had not been developers, but tightfisted dealers who built an empire on debt and hard bargains. The young DiLorenzo had to learn the game.
Although Alex III did well, he has the resigned air of a man who is a failure in his own eyes. “I had bigger dreams,” he admits. “Much bigger dreams. They’ve been honed down to size.” What did he want to do? “Oh, Christ. I wanted to save the world. Don’t laugh. A lot of people were there. I became a lot more cynical over time, I guess.”
DiLorenzo does have a cynical edge, but more often he comes across as almost implausibly naïve. He seems surprised that his warehousing of apartments in West Harlem has provoked outrage from neighborhood residents. After all, he put $4.5 million of his own money into upgrading those dilapidated brownstones—who else is investing up in Harlem?—and, as his reward, “I’m getting my ass kicked.” It has not dawned on DiLorenzo that the working class people living in those rent-controlled buildings don’t want remodeled apartments they can’t afford. “Tenants always get very emotional,” he says, as though it’s an epiphany. Well, yes, but we’re talking about people’s homes. “I hear ya,” DiLorenzo says, nodding. “But sometimes it gets out of line, in my opinion.”
Scarpa, Sr., ordered that no one but Greg, Jr., attempt to flee—it is believed that he wanted to learn how strong a case the government had against his son-and the nine crewmen were arrested on November 12, 1987. Greg, Jr., could not be found. Valerie Caproni, the Brooklyn federal prosecutor handling the case, was angry. “This was going to be a big, expensive case to try, and our top defendant was in the wind,” she recalls. He was not caught until August, 1988, after being featured on the television program “America’s Most Wanted,” by which time Caproni had convicted the nine crewmen. Though she subsequently convicted Greg, Jr., and he got twenty years, she complains that it was “not a lot of fun” to have to mount a second trial.
Caproni, a Southerner with a reputation for toughness, has since risen to chief of the criminal division of the Brooklyn United States Attorney’s Office. In early 1994, she learned from two of the convicted crewmen, who had become cooperating witnesses, that in 1987 Greg, Jr., had obtained a list of all her defendants. She plainly suspects Lindley DeVecchio; in a court document she states that there is “some reason to believe” he leaked the list. DeVecchio vehemently denies doing so, but Caproni recalls that in the summer of 1987, while the D.E.A. case was being developed, she invited an F.B.I. agent named Michael Tabman to a planning meeting, and that Tabman took notes. Tabman later recalled, in a sworn statement, that sometime after the meeting he’d told DeVecchio about the D.E.A. case, and found him “very interested in this matter.”
Caproni also finds some reason to believe that DeVecchio leaked another piece of confidential information to Scarpa in 1987—information that nearly got a man killed. She recalls saying at the summer meeting in Tabman’s presence that one of the crewmen she planned to indict, Cosmo Catanzano, was “a weak link,” who might cooperate if he was arrested. Tabman says he doesn’t remember this. That same summer, Greg, Jr., informed one of his crewmen (who later cooperated with federal authorities) that his father’s “agent source” had warned that Catanzano was “going to rat.” Sometime after that, Scarpa, Sr., ordered that Catanzano be murdered and buried-and quickly, because the D.E.A. arrests were imminent. Two crewmen dug a grave for Catanzano in a secluded spot off the Arthur Kill Road, in Staten Island, but Catanzano’s execution was foiled by his arrest. He never did cooperate. DeVecchio denies ever mentioning Catanzano to Scarpa.
CAPRONI would not say anything about DeVecchio in an interview, but she lavishly praised an agent named Christopher Favo, who had worked under him, and who became DeVecchio’s most vocal accuser. Favo, an attorney and a graduate of Notre Dame, joined the Bureau in 1983. “I think Chris Favo is an excellent agent,” Caproni said. “He’s an extremely hard worker. He’s very bright. I have used him as a witness in a couple of cases, and find him to be easy to prepare. He has a good memory.” During the Colombo war, Favo was, among other things, an information liaison between the F.B.I. and New York City police officers, who found him rather straitlaced—”like a young seminarian,” one recalls. But that was all right: the cops had been given the job of trying to suppress the war by arresting people for carrying guns, and they believed that Favo could be trusted. The standard criticism of Favo was that he worked too hard—he seemed never to go home—and that he wanted to do everything himself and would not delegate responsibility.
DeVecchio doesn’t share Caproni’s high opinion of Favo. “Suffice it to say, he’s not a favorite of mine,” he says. “Everything’s black-and-white for Chris Favo. If you were crossing the street and missed the crosswalk by a foot, he’d give you a ticket for jaywalking. And he’s an egomaniac of the worst kind.”
It was Favo who eventually reported DeVecchio to the Bureau. Though Favo was joined by three other agents when he voiced his suspicions, DeVecchio says those agents were “duped” by Favo. They all misinterpreted his actions, he says, because they all lacked street experience, and had “no clue” to what it took to operate a top-echelon source. “Favo used to say, ‘I’ve got a lot of experience with cooperating witnesses,’” DeVecchio says. “So what? Anybody can make a deal with some guy who doesn’t want to go to jail for the rest of his life. He never worked in the street covertly and developed an informant.”
Favo’s thoughts and actions during the Colombo war have been preserved in testimony, affidavits, memorandums, and a daily diary. He was the senior field agent investigating the war, and was one of the first agents on the scene on November 18, 1991, when its opening shots were fired—at Greg Scarpa.
Scarpa had been predicting a shooting war for some time—ever since it became apparent that the family’s acting boss, Victor Orena, Sr., was trying to depose the jailed Carmine Persico and take over the family. From Scarpa, and from Scarpa’s girlfriend’s daughter, who was also named Linda, Favo learned what had happened. Scarpa was pulling out of his driveway in his car, and Linda, with her infant son, was pulling out in another car, when a van and a panel truck blocked their way. A group of men in ski masks jumped out of the van and opened fire with automatic weapons, leaving a row of bullet holes in the fender of Linda’s car. Scarpa escaped by driving up onto the sidewalk, past the panel truck. (He later groused that for the gunmen to have even risked hitting Linda and her son showed that discipline was falling apart in the Mafia.) Favo took down the plate number of the truck, which had been left behind, and traced it to a rental office in Queens. He says he provided that information to DeVecchio, whom he had not yet begun to suspect of leaking information to Scarpa. He says he didn’t learn until after the war, from a cooperator, that someone had told Scarpa where the truck had been rented.
Scarpa believed that the gunmen had been sent by William (Wild Bill) Cutolo, then reputedly the acting underboss. Scarpa made plans to disguise himself as a Hasidic Jew and mow down Wild Bill as he left his girlfriend’s house on Thanksgiving Day, 1991, but that morning an article in the Post mentioned the snitch rumor about Scarpa, and he was forced to call off the hit so that he could assuage his confederates. Between December 3rd and January 7th, Scarpa did kill two other rebels, wounded a third, and accidentally shot and killed a Genovese family associate, who was blamed for his own death, because he was at a Colombo hangout at the time. There was no more talk of Scarpa being a snitch.
In a 1995 sworn statement DeVecchio denied ever deliberately leaking intelligence to Scarpa, but he said it was possible that Scarpa had inferred information from his questions, adding, “You cannot debrief a top-echelon source in a vacuum.” Though the entire record is not available, it appears that much of the information that Scarpa was giving back during the war was worse than useless. F.B.I. documents show that he repeatedly pinned his wartime violence on other people; they also show that DeVecchio conferred with Scarpa on the very day Scarpa committed one of his murders.
As the war escalated, DeVecchio found it difficult to reach Scarpa by phone, and one time he dropped by Scarpa’s house. Whenever DeVecchio met with an informant at home, he brought along one or two other agents, to make the visit look like an intrusion. He did not let his subordinates participate in the debriefing with Scarpa, however; he sat them down in Scarpa’s living room, with the television turned on, while he spoke privately with his informant in the kitchen for about an hour.
Some of Scarpa’s men later told federal authorities that during the war Scarpa was paged frequently by The Girlfriend. He was warned to be careful, and to watch out in particular for a rebel nicknamed Joe Waverly. In January, 1992, Scarpa and Waverly had a gunfight from adjacent cars, two feet apart, near Avenue U. Waverly shot out Scarpa’s window, and Scarpa, whose Tec‑9 had misfired, sped off with glass fragments in his hair. On February 26th, out on Avenue U, Scarpa shot Waverly in the stomach.
The following day, Favo appears to have formed his first suspicions about DeVecchio. That morning, a loan shark named Carmine Imbriale was arrested by the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, and he told the authorities that he’d been at a dinner the evening before at which Scarpa had proposed a toast and bragged about shooting Waverly. The D.A.’s office alerted Favo, and he conveyed the news to DeVecchio. Favo says that DeVecchio then got a phone call from Scarpa, and told Scarpa that the Brooklyn D.A.’s office had Imbriale in temporary custody, adding, “I don’t know what he’s saying about you.” Favo was concerned that DeVecchio had just endangered Imbriale’s life. And, in fact, that evening, according to a cooperator, Scarpa said, “It would be a good idea to kill Imbriale.” Favo claims that he persuaded DeVecchio to call Scarpa the next day and warn him that if any harm came to Imbriale he would be held suspect. DeVecchio says that neither phone conversation with Scarpa about Imbriale took place, and that he has “no idea” why Favo would invent such a story.
A report that Scarpa had boasted about shooting someone was not sufficient evidence to arrest him, but it should have been cause, according to the Department of Justice guidelines on F.B.I. informants, to consider closing him. DeVecchio did not seem inclined to do so. Around the same time, however, DeVecchio’s immediate supervisor, Donald North, to whom all the Mafia squads reported, became uneasy about Scarpa. North had been told by an agent not on DeVecchio’s squad that Scarpa was conspiring to murder someone. (The intended victim’s identity has not been revealed.) North has testified that he asked DeVecchio if he had reason to believe that Scarpa was committing crimes of violence. “He was adamant,” North recalled. “He was convinced that Mr. Scarpa was not engaged in any violent activity.” Nevertheless, North checked on the information about the murder conspiracy and found it credible, so, as of March 3, 1992, Scarpa was ordered closed, and DeVecchio was told to have no further contact with him. A month later, F.B.I. headquarters permitted DeVecchio to reopen Scarpa, after he attributed the murder-conspiracy charge against Scarpa to the “paranoia” among Colombo-family members which had been engendered by the war.
On May 22nd, Scarpa killed again. At about three-thirty in the morning, as the rebel soldier Larry Lampesi was locking the gate of his apartment building, Scarpa shot him with a rifle extended from his car window, then got out of the car with two of his crewmen and pumped some extra rounds into his body. The same morning, another Colombo rebel was wounded in a second incident.
A few hours later, Favo says he stopped by DeVecchio’s office to report the two shootings. Twice in court, in the past two years, Favo has given a dramatic account of how he says DeVecchio reacted to the news. Favo said he and his fellow-agents believed that “every time there was a shooting or a murder it was a defeat for us”; but DeVecchio “laughed” and “got excited” at the report, and, with his open palm, slapped his desk and said, “We’re going to win this thing!” Favo said DeVecchio “seemed to be a cheerleader for the Persico faction,” and also testified, “A line had been blurred.… He was compromised. He had lost track of who he was.” DeVecchio has acknowledged making “some statement to that effect,” but thinks it was in front of “probably half a dozen agents,” and that he obviously meant the F.B.I. was going to win in its efforts to fight organized crime. He adds, “If I’m siding with an organized-crime family, why would I tell that to my agents? What person in their right mind would do that?”
By late spring, the war was winding down. A number of the rebels had been arrested, including the faction leader, Victor Orena. In June, agents on DeVecchio’s squad placed a microphone in a car belonging to Scarpa’s crewman Joey Ambrosino, a Persico faction member. DeVecchio says he approved of the electronic surveillance—bolstering his contention that he was not playing sides in the war—though there is an odd passage in his sworn statement concerning its use. He wrote that “Scarpa, Sr., was astounded to learn that Ambrosino’s car had been ‘bugged’ and that I had not told him of this situation.” One is left to wonder why Scarpa would ever have expected to be told.
The bug was a productive one, and DeVecchio’s agents began making arrests, starting with Ambrosino, who immediately elected to cooperate, and who connected Scarpa to at least one killing. Still, DeVecchio made no move to close Scarpa. “I saw this to be a dilemma,” one of DeVecchio’s agents later said, in a sworn statement. “I know if this was my source, I would have gone to the U.S. Attorney’s to obtain a warrant for his arrest.” Chris Favo had a plan to do exactly that: he asked a Brooklyn prosecutor if he could write up a murder-conspiracy complaint against Scarpa as soon as Favo gave the signal. He kept his plan a secret from DeVecchio. He has testified that by then “I believed that he was liable to say anything to Gregory Scarpa.”
Meanwhile, the squad continued to make other arrests—so rapidly, in some cases, that DeVecchio was not notified in advance. In late June, agents arrested four Colombo suspects at an apartment in Point Pleasant, New Jersey. When the agents next saw DeVecchio, he was visibly agitated. One of them, Howard Leadbetter, a former Army officer who had worked in Special Operations, said in a sworn statement that he heard DeVecchio, “in a very forceful tone of voice,” tell Favo, “ ‘I’ve had it! You will not arrest another single individual without my specific approval!’” Leadbetter testified in court that he could not understand DeVecchio’s agitation until sometime later, when he learned that Scarpa had been at the New Jersey apartment earlier that day and had narrowly avoided being arrested himself.
On the morning of August 31st, Favo dropped by DeVecchio’s office, and told him that Scarpa was about to turn himself in to New York City police detectives on a gun charge. During the month that Scarpa had been closed by the F.B.I., he’d been seen tossing a loaded automatic from the window of his car. DeVecchio knew all about the gun arrest and, according to Favo, seemed unconcerned: it had been agreed beforehand that Scarpa would be arraigned and released. Only three days earlier, Scarpa had settled his medical-malpractice case, and had told a Newsday reporter that he was planning to celebrate with a vacation in Florida. Favo then sprang his surprise: he informed DeVecchio that immediately after the gun arraignment Scarpa was going to be arrested by two of DeVecchio’s own agents and booked on federal murder-conspiracy charges. “DeVecchio was visibly upset” by that news, Favo says, and tried to alert Scarpa via the confidential hello line, but it was too late.
EVEN then, DeVecchio did not abandon his top-echelon source. He got in touch with prosecutors at the Brooklyn United States Attorney’s Office to ask them to request bail for Scarpa. One prosecutor, Andrew Weissmann, later said he was “incredulous” that any agent would want Scarpa on the street, and, at a September bail hearing, before the federal magistrate John L. Caden, Weissmann argued vigorously for detention. Caden was not aware that Scarpa was an informant, and the attorney representing Scarpa at the hearing, Joseph Benfante, says he wasn’t aware of it, either. “That would be tantamount to me thinking that Mother Teresa is assisting Saddam Hussein, because no F.B.I. informant goes out and engages in a Colombo war—it’s insanity,” Benfante says.
Benfante’s motion for bail was made strictly on the ground of Scarpa’s medical condition. By now, Scarpa had full-blown AIDS, with a T‑cell count of zero (two thousand is normal), and at his malpractice trial in August his doctor had testified that he had between two and six months to live. Benfante says that Scarpa had also begun to show signs of AIDS dementia. During visits he paid to Scarpa in prison, he recalls, “He told me to make a list—he wants to give all the guards attache cases, special cases of wine, and filet-mignon steaks. I told him, ‘Greg, you can’t have a steak in prison.’ ‘What do you mean!’ He’d throw the chair. The next day, he’d be fine.”
Judge Caden agreed to house arrest, with the stipulation that Scarpa wear an electronic anklet that would alert police if he left the house. All went well until December 29, 1992, when Scarpa’s son by Linda Schiro, Joseph, got into a dispute over a drug transaction, and was said to have told his father that he had been spoken to disrespectfully. Scarpa rushed out of the house armed, went around the block, and got into a gun battle with two Bay Ridge drug dealers, one of whom he is believed to have killed. In the altercation, Scarpa’s left eye was shot out. He is said to have walked back home, pressed a towel to his bleeding eye socket, drunk a glass of Scotch, and—because Schiro was hysterical—driven himself to Mt. Sinai Hospital. Joseph has since been killed in what was apparently a drug-related shooting.
Scarpa’s house arrest was revoked. It was agreed that he would be sent to Rikers Island, a prison known for its superior AIDS facility, to serve a year on his gun charge. It seemed inconceivable that a man with a zero-T-cell count and no stomach, who had just had an eye shot out, would live anywhere near that long. The following spring, however, Scarpa was still alive, and on May 6, 1993, he appeared before federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein to plead guilty to three murders and conspiracy to murder several others.
Then, in October, at a meeting with prosecutors at the Brooklyn United States Attorney’s Office, Scarpa offered, unsuccessfully, to become a cooperating witness for the government. He had asked his new attorney, a former prosecutor named Steven Kartagener, to make sure that DeVecchio attended. Kartagener recalls that at one point “Greg says, ‘I’ve always been helpful to the government in the past—isn’t that right, Mr. DeVecchio?’” and goes on to recount, “I assumed DeVecchio would say, ‘What are you talking about? Stop being an asshole.’ Instead, he says, ‘Yes, that’s true.’ My jaw did a bounce off the tabletop.” Two prosecutors recall hearing DeVecchio tell Favo at an earlier meeting that if there were “an O.P.R.”—an Office of Professional Responsibility inquiry—into DeVecchio’s handling of Scarpa “I’ll have your ass.”
Scarpa’s sentencing for murder and murder conspiracy took place on December 15, 1993. Judge Weinstein asked Scarpa if he had anything to say, and was told no, “other than I expect to go home.”
“You’re not going to go home,” Weinstein said. “You’re going to go to prison.”
“I tried to help, Your Honor,” Scarpa said. “But it just didn’t work out.”
During Scarpa’s final days in prison, his AIDS dementia took hold, and he was given to rambling. Occasionally, he spoke of the dirty work he claimed to have done for the government. He told one visitor how, after kidnapping a Mississippi man for the F.B.I., “he placed a gun in the guy’s mouth, and started cutting his dick off with a razor” and demanded that the man tell him the location of “three kids that were missing”—lending credence to a report, first published in the Daily News, that Scarpa had led the F.B.I. to the buried bodies of the civil-rights workers Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney, slain in Philadelphia, Mississippi, in 1964. He also spoke about a secret assignment in Costa Rica for the United States government in the sixties that involved murder. On June 8, 1994, Scarpa died, of complications from AIDS, at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota.
FOR a year and half after the Colombo war ended, Chris Favo kept quiet about DeVecchio. He says he was worried that if he accused a well-respected veteran like DeVecchio of leaking confidential information the F.B.I. brass “would take it about as well as I would take it if somebody came up to me and said my wife was unfaithful.” By January, 1994, however, Favo and three agents on his squad felt compelled to come forward. Several of Scarpa’s crewmen had begun to cooperate, and their accounts of Scarpa and his alleged law-enforcement source were disturbing. Most disturbing, Favo says, was that during the Colombo war he had given DeVecchio a partial address for the hideout of the rebel leader, Victor Orena, and a physical description—a white, two-family house, with aluminum siding—and an incorrect address for one of Orena’s men. Now it appeared from statements made by a cooperator that Scarpa’s crew had tried unsuccessfully to locate and kill those two rebels after Scarpa supplied them with the identical information.
Favo’s diary records what happened when he and the three other agents—Raymond Andjich, Howard Leadbetter, and Jeffrey Tomlinson—came forward that month to voice their concerns to officials at the New York office. At first they were commended for taking action, and assured of confidentiality, but only two weeks later, Favo wrote in his diary, an F.B.I. official carelessly exposed him and Leadbetter as whistle-blowers; when he complained, he says, the official told him that he personally believed in DeVecchio’s innocence, and that “we will have to live with the problems.” A few days after that, Favo wrote, DeVecchio called a squad meeting, at which he angrily denied the charges and added that “anyone that did not believe him could go f— themselves.” Before long, Favo had concluded that blowing the whistle on DeVecchio “was a mistake that would follow us for our careers.”
By March, 1994, an internal O.P.R. investigation of DeVecchio was under way. He was eventually moved out of organized crime and into drug enforcement, and, in the meantime, his investigation was transferred from the Bureau to the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice. The investigation proceeded slowly, and was kept quiet, even as alleged participants in the Colombo war continued to go to trial for murder and assault.
It was not until the summer of 1994 that, largely through the efforts of the New York attorney Alan Futerfas and his associate, Ellen Resnick, the investigation came to light. Futerfas and Resnick had been retained by a number of defendants accused of participation in the Colombo war. They immediately recognized the DeVecchio controversy as a gold mine for the defense, and they used it to formulate what might be called the “comrades in arms” theory of the war. According to this theory, the F.B.I. had deliberately fed Scarpa information, to help foment the war, and to make certain that he would emerge victorious. Futerfas argues that when DeVecchio allegedly declared, “We’re going to win this thing,” he was expressing the hope that Scarpa would end up as a boss when it was all over, with a seat on the Mafia’s ruling commission.
The comrades-in-arms theory, whatever its merits, has been an unqualified success with juries. There have been nine trials stemming from the Colombo war, and at two of them the judges have permitted evidence of DeVecchio’s relationship with Scarpa to be introduced. At both trials, every defendant—fourteen in all, including Wild Bill Cutolo—was acquitted of all charges. At the conclusion of one trial, a juror told the Daily News, “If the F.B.I.’s like this, society is really in trouble.” Some people who were convicted before the DeVecchio controversy became known have made motions for new trials. It was at a hearing on one such motion last May that DeVecchio took the Fifth.
Despite its interest in winning convictions, the Brooklyn United States Attorney’s Office has done nothing to make DeVecchio look good; the government has even conceded that DeVecchio “may have” disclosed confidential information to Scarpa, including, as Favo had charged, the whereabouts of people Scarpa was looking for. Douglas Grover, the lawyer for DeVecchio, blames the “rape” of his client by the Brooklyn United States Attorney’s Office on Valerie Caproni, the head of the criminal division. He says that she continues to bear a grudge against DeVecchio in the mistaken belief that he leaked word of her 1987 drug indictment, causing Greg Scarpa, Jr., to flee. “A government prosecutor should be defending the government’s actions, but Valerie wanted to get Lin,” Grover says. Caproni disputes this. “I don’t know what Mr. Grover would have had us do, given that evidence,” she says.
Grover nevertheless had been predicting since earlier this year that DeVecchio would be cleared. And on September 4, 1996, after two and a half years, the O.P.R. investigation ended abruptly with a two-sentence letter stating that prosecution of DeVecchio was “not warranted.”
DeVecchio has continued to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, however, and the controversy may not be over. Scarpa’s relationship with the F.B.I. may be an issue at the upcoming trial of Gregory Scarpa, Jr., who is still serving time on his drug case, and who was indicted last year for acts of racketeering, including murder. He disputes DeVecchio’s claim that DeVecchio never leaked information. Greg, Jr.,’s defense is expected to be that his alleged crimes actually were committed by his late father, and that the government is trying to pin them on Greg, Jr., to cover up its corrupt relationship with Scarpa, Sr. Through his attorney, Larry Silverman, Greg, Jr., claims to have known firsthand that DeVecchio was his father’s law-enforcement source and that he was the person known as The Girlfriend. He may even attempt to sell these allegations directly to the jury by taking the stand. Silverman has told the court that he would like to call DeVecchio.
The Bureau continues to maintain its silence, and many questions about the DeVecchio matter remain unanswered. Though the F.B.I.’s long relationship with Scarpa appears to have shocked jurors, who found it sordid, it came as less of a surprise to people in other branches of law enforcement. They have long viewed the F.B.I. as an institution with its own agenda, obsessed with making successful cases even at the expense of upholding the law. There is nothing in the record to dispute DeVecchio’s claim, echoed by his attorney, that “I didn’t operate in a vacuum,” and that key decisions concerning Scarpa, including the decision to reopen him during the war, were made with “the full knowledge of any number of people well above me in rank.”
IN October, Lin DeVecchio retired from the F.B.I., after thirty-three years of service. His retirement party was held at a seafood restaurant in lower Manhattan. About fifty well-wishers turned out. It was a crowd made up largely of F.B.I. retirees—”an old-timers’ night,” in the words of one guest—and, when speeches were made, the crowd got boisterous. The subject of DeVecchio’s O.P.R. was far from taboo, and as one retirement gift was handed to him somebody yelled, “Lin—it’s a subpoena!” There was never any question, however, that the crowd was in DeVecchio’s corner, and near the end of the evening the last speaker, a retired agent, broke down in sobs, and declared, “Lin DeVecchio is not corrupt! Lin DeVecchio did what he believed was right!”
How the crowd felt about Christopher Favo was no secret, either. One speaker presented DeVecchio with an infectious-agent clothing kit, in case he should ever come in contact again with “the viral, infectious agent who started all this.” James Kossler, a retired supervisor to whom DeVecchio had once reported, expressed his views about DeVecchio’s accuser before the party: “The trouble with Chris Favo is that Chris Favo has a very high opinion of himself. He works sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and you lose all objectivity when that happens. You see things you can’t relate to or understand. This whole thing was a travesty, and Lin’s reputation has been destroyed. Why wasn’t Favo stopped? If I’d been there, I would have cut his nuts off.”
Favo remains an F.B.I. agent, but recently he was transferred from New York to a regional office in the Midwest. The three other agents who reported DeVecchio to the Bureau continue to work in New York; one of them recently testified that Favo had “taken the brunt of a lot of this.” Valerie Caproni says of Favo, “The fact that he’s no longer working organized-crime cases in New York is to me just a horrible fallout of this whole thing,” and adds, “It’s been a very difficult situation, as it always is for a whistle-blower.” Reached by phone recently, Favo said he’d be happy to comment on how he ended up in the Midwest, or answer any other question, pending permission from the F.B.I., which, as he guessed correctly, was denied.♦